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seizures. But even if the decision is limited by precluding the use of university gathered evidence in a criminal prosecution, 53 the student remains
subject to university disciplinary proceedings that could terminate his education and leave a deleterious record for his future.5 4
By holding that a university cannot consent to a police search, the instant
decision clarifies a dormitory student's protection against unreasonable search
and seizure. The student, however, still lacks full constitutional protection,
since the university may conduct a warrantless search pursuant to its regulations requiring students to submit to such searches. Since the instant decision did not discuss the necessity of the warrant requirement and its effect
on the university-student relationship, it remains for future decisions to determine what measure of protection the fourth amendment provides for the
student against university searches. Until such questions are resolved, the
dormitory student remains subject to administrative control above and beyond
that of other citizens.
GEORGE W. ESTESS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CLOSING PUBLIC POOLS TO AVOID
RACIAL INTEGRATION NOT A DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION
Palmerv. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971)
Petitioners, black citizens of Jackson, Mississippi, brought a class action
to force the city to reopen its swimming pools and operate them on an integrated basis., A federal district court denied the declarative and injunctive
relief prayed for under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, six of thirteen judges dis53. This could be accomplished through an extension of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

(1961).
54. See Jacobson, The Expulsion of Students and Due Process of Law, 34 J. HiGMR
En. 250 (1963); Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights, and Responsibilities,
54 CALIF. L. Rav. 23 (1966); Note, Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Noncriminal Proceedings,22 U. FLA. L. REv. 38 (1969).

1. The city of Jackson, Mississippi, prior to 1962 operated all its public recreational
facilities on a racially segregated basis. In that year certain of its black citizens brought
an action against the city in the United States district court. They sought declaratory
relief under the 13th and 14th amendments and an injunction to prevent the city from
continuing to discriminate in the operation of its facilities. The district court held that
the discrimination complained of did violate equal protection of the laws, but issued no
injunction. The court preferred instead to rely upon the city officials' voluntary compliance
with the judgment. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d
637 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). The city subsequently integrated all its
recreational facilities with the exception of its five swimming pools. These were closed in
1963 and have remained dosed. Palmer v. Thompson, 391 F.2d 324, 325 (5th Cir. 1967).
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senting.2 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed and HELD,
the city's closing of all city operated pools to all citizens was not a denial of
equal protection, since neither the fourteenth amendment nor Congress imposes an affirmative duty on the states to provide or maintain recreational
facilities for the public.

3

After Plessy v. Ferguson4 the doctrine of "separate but equal" sanctioned
segregation of the races at public recreation facilities. However, the facilities
provided for blacks were generally separate but not equal to those provided
for whites. 5 After World War II the Supreme Court began to interpret the
fourteenth amendment to require equality in state provided facilities, 6 particularly in the area of education where the Court recognized that separate
could not be equal. 7 In the 1954 landmark opinion, Brown v. Board of Education,8 the separate but equal doctrine was specifically overruled in the field
of education because separate educational facilities were "inherently unequal." 9
The Brown rationale was soon extended to areas other than education.' 0
One week after its decision in Brown the Supreme Court vacated a judgment
upholding segregation by the lessees of a city owned amphitheater and remanded the case "for consideration in the light of the Segregation Cases.""
Negro citizens have subsequently initiated numerous suits 12 seeking integration of public golf courses, parks, auditoriums, swimming pools, and other
facilities. A state action denying blacks access to and use of public recrea-

2. Palmer v. Thompson, 391 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd on rehearing,419 F.2d 1222
(5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
3. 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (Douglas, White, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. See McKay, Segregation and Publication Recreation, 40 VA. L. REv. 697, 702-06
(1954).
6. E.g., Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974
(1954) (golf course); Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 205
F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953) (swimming pool); Boyer v.
Garrett, 88 F. Supp. 353 (D. Md. 1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 912 (1951) (athletic facilities at park); Rice v. Arnold, 45 So. 2d 195 (Fla.), vacated,
340 U.S. 848 (1950), judgment of Fla. cir. ct. afl'd, 54 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 946 (1952) (golf course).
7. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); accord, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
9. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Accord, Boiling v. Sharp, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954), where the Supreme Court stated: "Classifications based solely upon
race must be scrutinized with particular care ......
10. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf course); Dawson v. Mayor & City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches). See generally McKay, supra note 5.
11. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating & remanding
202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
12. E.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtrooms); Eubanks v. Louisiana,
356 U.S. 584 (1958) (buses); Hanes v. Shuttlesworth, 310 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1962) (parks);
City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 922
(1957) (swimming pool); Ward v. City of Miami, 151 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Fla. 1957) (golf
course); Fayson v. Beard, 134 F. Supp, 379 (E.D. Tex. 1955) (park).
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tional facilities has been generally found to violate the fourteenth amendment. 8
Where devious methods or delaying tactics have been employed by governmental bodies to avoid desegregation of public recreational facilities, the
courts have not hesitated to take action. Sale14 and lease 5 of public facilities
to private individuals to avoid desegregation have been held to violate the
fourteenth amendment. In Watson v. City of Memphis- the city pointed to
the partial desegregation of its parks and other facilities and argued the need
for moving slowly and gradually toward total desegregation. The Supreme
Court held that any further denial of the use of city facilities by the Negro
petitioners was without justification."7 The Brown decision, according to the
Court, never intended or contemplated that "deliberate speed" would mean
lengthy delay in the elimination of racial discrimination in public recreation. 8
Lower federal courts, however, have also indicated that there is no constitutional duty for a state to provide recreational facilities for its citizens
no matter how desirable that may be, and that a bona fide sale or a complete
cessation of operation of a facility will not violate the fourteenth amendment. 9 Consistent with this reasoning are several cases where the closing or
sale of a facility in the face of a court order to desegregate has not been
held to be a denial of equal protection or contempt of court.20
The instant case arose out of the closing of five swimming pools by the
city of Jackson in the face of a district court declaratory judgment that the
segregated operation of recreational facilities by a city was a denial of equal
protection of the law.21 The city desegregated its parks, zoo, golf course, and
auditorium but decided to close the pools rather than operate them on an
integrated basis. 22 The continued economic loss in operating the pools and

the possibility of public disturbances resulting from integration were cited
as justifications. 23 The petitioners, relying upon the equal protection clause

13. E.g., City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353

U.S. 922 (1957).
14. Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
911 (1962).
15. City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1967). See also Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
16. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
17. Id. at 539.
18. Id. at 530-32.
19. E.g., Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 1962); Willie v.
Harris County, 202 F. Supp. 549, 552 (S.D. Tex. 1962).
20. E.g., Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962) (pool); City of
Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960) (parks); Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1960) (pool).
21. Clark v. Thompson, 206 F. Supp. 539 (S.D. Miss. 1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 637 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
22. 403 U.S. at 219.
23. Id. Where there was ongoing racial discrimination these reasons have been dismissed
as insufficient. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (delay in desegregating
public parks and other facilities); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (attempt to suspend
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of the fourteenth amendment, argued that the city's reasons for closing the
pools could not be sustained where the state action 24 was based upon a suspect
classification.25 The Court acknowledged the validity of this argument but
stated that the basic issue was whether the citizens of Jackson were, in fact,
27
26
being denied their constitutional rights. The majority found they were not,
28
reasoning that the closing of the pools affected blacks and whites equally.
The petitioners relied in part on Griffin v. County School Board29 where
all the public schools in Prince Edward County, Virginia, were closed and
replaced by private schools for white students only. State and county funds
were eventually used to finance the private schools and tax credits were given
to those who donated to the schools. The Supreme Court held that this disguised attempt to perpetuate segregated schools through state action constituted a denial of equal protection of the law. 0 The instant case was distinguished from Griffin because no public funds were being used to operate
segregated public or private pools. 1
2 The majority also distinguished Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board,
in which the Court struck down state statutes expressly designed to continue
segregation in the Louisiana public schools. 3 3 The Court noted that Bush

involved public schools, an enterprise described in Brown as "perhaps the
most important function of state and local government." 34 There was no
indication in the instant case, however, that the criteria for desegregation
35
of public recreation facilities should be different from those for schools.

Another ground urged by the petitioners was the alleged motivation of
the Jackson city council in closing the pools.2 6 Despite the pools being
closed in response to the district court judgment, the Supreme Court refused
to consider motivation as the sole criterion in finding a denial of equal pro-

school desegregation plan); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (municipal ordinance
prohibiting whites or blacks from moving into any block where a greater number of
houses were occupied by members of the opposite race).
24. The acts of the city council constituted state action. 403 U.S. at 220.
25. Id. at 224-26.
26. Id. at 226.
27. Id. at 225-26.
28. In the past, similar reasoning has been deemed spurious. See Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (criminal conviction in miscegenation case); Anderson v. Martin, 375 US.
399 (1964) (voting laws).
29. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
30. Id. at 232.
31. 403 U.S. 217, 222.
32. 365 U.S. 569 (1961), affirming 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960).
33. The statute involved in the instant case is very general. Miss. CODE ANN. §3374-112
(Supp. 1968) authorizes municipalities to "purchase and hold real estate . . . for all proper
municipal purposes, including parks . . . to sell and convey any real .. . property owned by
it . . . as may be deemed conducive to the best interest of the municipality ...
"
34. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
35. 403 U.S. at 221 n.6. But see id. at 229. The dissenters insisted that there was no
difference.
36. 403 U.S. at 224.
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tection. Motivation, it seems, is only relevant when there is a suspect classification or an apparent denial of equal protection.3 7 The actual effect of the
legislative enactment, not motivation, was the critical factor in the Court's
determination of the constitutionality of the city's actions.38 In addition,
while the Court acknowledged that the council may have been motivated
by racial considerations, the economic and public safety reasons advanced
for dosing the pools were deemed legitimate under the circumstances. The
39
law on its face was not designed to prevent desegregation.
This reasoning was emphatically denounced in the dissenting opinion of
Justice White, who argued that the Court had avoided the issue of motivation.40 Prior to the actual closing of the pools, the mayor of Jackson made
public statements to the effect that he and the council were determined to
keep the facilities segregated. Justice White pointed out that while the
city's pools had been losing 11,700 dollars annually, the decision by the council
to close the pools and desegregate the other facilities came only after the
Supreme Court had affirmed the order to desegregate the public facilities.4'
Furthermore, the council's fear of racial violence at the pools in the event
of desegregation was unsubstantiated. These disturbing facts left "little
doubt that shutting down the pools was nothing more or less than a most
effective expression of official policy that Negroes and whites must not be
42
permitted to mingle together when using the services provided by the city."
The opinions in the instant case reflect the full range of arguments that
have been advanced in the segregation cases since Brown. 43 The instant case
was strongly criticized when decided by the lower courts, 44 and on its face

appears contrary to the trend in equal protection litigation. The Supreme
Court looked to the end product of the city's action and found the record
showed: (1) no collusion between the city and any private organization; (2)
no encouragement of private discrimination; and (3) no unequal effect of
the dosing upon blacks as opposed to whites. The Court agreed that where
37. Id. at 225. In Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964), the Supreme
Court said: "Whatever nonracial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to
abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one ..... not based on race.
In Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), the majority assumed arguendo, and the dissent
took as established law, that while a park may be constitutionally dosed for a legitimate
reason, strong or weak, or for no reason at all, it cannot be dosed solely to avoid the duty
to desegregate.
38. Id. But see Abascal, Municipal Services and Equal Protection: Variations on a
Theme by Griffin v. Illinois, 20 HAsTnNGs L.J. 1367, 1381 (1969).
39. 403 U.S. at 225.
40. 403 U.S. at 240-71.
41. Id. at 249-51.
42. Id. at 241.
43. The petitioners also alleged that the dosing of the pools was a "badge or incident"
of slavery condemned by the thirteenth amendment. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIII. The argument was summarily rejected by the Court. 403 U.S. at 226-27.
44. Comment, Closing Public Pools To Avoid Desegregation: Treading Water, 58 GEo.
L.J. 1220 (1970); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Civil Rights-Closing Municipal Swimming Pools
in Response to Desegregation Order Does Not Violate Negro Plaintiffs' Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendment Rights, 16 WAYNE L.REv. 1434 (1970).
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constitutional rights were involved, fear of violence and a desire to save
money would not justify an otherwise impermissible state action. The basic
weakness of the instant decision appears to be the Court's refusal, because it
found no patent constitutional violation, to examine the city's motive for
closing its pools. This evidences a basic unwillingness of the majority to
scrutinize each local termination of public service to ascertain whether some
constitutional mandate has been violated. 45 More importantly, although federal courts treat public recreation in the same manner as "essential" public
functions, such as education where there is ongoing discrimination, 46 they do
not use the same criteria when an attempt is made to close down the facility
altogether.
While recreation may be very desirable and beneficial to the health and
welfare of the public, the Court did not deem it as inherently important as
education. In light of the present case, a 5-4 decision based upon a "very
meager record," 47 it would be theoretically possible for a governmental body
to close down all its recreational facilities in order to avoid desegregation.
The Supreme Court has thus allowed a city to withdraw a traditional public
function for the obvious purpose of preventing that public function from
being operated without regard to race.4 For this decision to be controlling in
future segregation litigation, the legal issues and fact situation will hopefully
be limited to the narrow grounds involved therein. 49
DAVID

A. Guy

45. 403 U.S. at 228.
46. See text accompanying notes 10-18 supra.
47. 403 U.S. at 228.
48. In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), the operation of a recreational facility
was seen by the Court as a traditional public function. It has been held in other areas
that even though a public service can be termed a benefit or a privilege, it may not be
withdrawn without due process of law. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). It has also
been held that a person may not be denied governmental benefits in violation of first
amendment rights. Sherbert v. Vernor, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
49. This case, however, along with Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (park) and
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (low income housing), indicates the Supreme Court
may now be less willing to scrutinize every case where a violation of the fourteenth
amendment is alleged but some plausible and legitimate end appears on the face of the
situation.
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